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JURISDICTION OF THE COUfeT
This is the brief of Salt Lake County opposing a petition
for certiorari filed by Sandy City, which seeks a review of a
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals entered on June 7, 1990.
The Court of Appeals affirmed a decision by the Third District
Court dismissing this action brought by Sandy City.

Rehearing

of the matter was denied by the Court of Appeals on August 6,
1990.

The

Supreme

review

this matter

Court

has

pursuant

discretionary

to Utah

jurisdiction

Cod^ Ann.

to

78-2-2(5) and

Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

CONTROLLING STATUTES
The controlling statutes in this case are Utah Code Ann.
10-1-104(11) and Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418, ^hich read as follows:
10-1-104(11):
"Urban
development"
means
a
housing subdivision involving more than
15 residential units with an Average of
less than one acre per residential unit
or a commercial or industrial development for which cost projections exceed
$750,000 for any or all phases.
10-2-418:
Urban development
shall not be
approved or permitted within! one-half
mile
of
a
municipality
in
the
unincorporated
territory
wjiich
the
municipality has proposed for municipal
expansion in its policy declaration, if
a municipality is willing to annex the
territory proposed for such development
under the standards and requirements set

forth
in
this
chapter;
provided,
however, that a property owner desiring
to develop or improve property within
the said one-half mile area may notify
the municipality
in writing of said
desire and identify with particularity
all
legal
and
factual
barriers
preventing
an
annexation
to
the
municipality.
At
the
end
of
12
consecutive months from the filing with
the municipality of said notice and
after a good faith and diligent effort
by said property owner to annex, said
property owner may develop as otherwise
permitted
by law.
Urban development
beyond one-half mile of a municipality
may be restricted or an impact statement
reguired when agreed to in an interlocal
agreement, under the provisions of the
Interlocal Co-operation Act.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This case presents the question as to whether there are
any special or important

reasons, as set forth in Rule 46 of

the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to justify Supreme Court
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
In November of 1987, Sandy City (Sandy) filed a complaint

in the Third District Court seeking an extraordinary writ and
declaratory and injunctive relief to void the approval by Salt
Lake County

(County) in October of 1987 of a conditional use

permit for a Chevron station on 0.7
10600 South
county

and

commonly

1300 East
referred

acres of land located at

in the unincorporated

to

as

-2-

"White

City."

R.

area

of

2-34.

the
The

complaint also souglit to void an earlier decision by the Board
of County Commissioners made in August of 1987 to rezone 4.18
acres of property which includes the Chevroh parcel.
Defendants
County

Planning

included

Salt Lake County

Commission,

Yeates, Priest, Kjar

Chevron,

and Smoot.

the station at issue.

and

the Salt

Po$tero-Blecker,

Chevron

Lake
Inc.,

is the developer of

Postero-Blecker act^d as Chevron's agent

in the land acquisition.

Defendants Yeat$s, Priest, Kjar and

Smoot were the owners of the larger parcel.
Motions for summary judgment were fi}ed by all defendants
in

January

of

cross-motion
affidavits
173.

for

1988.

summary

75,

Court

125,

judgment

and certain other

The certified

District

R.

B

and

documents

administrative

in

1^5.

accordance

Sandy
motion

filed

recordl was
with

certification entered on March 3, 1988.

£n

filed
to

a

strike

by Chevron.

R.

filed with

the

order

requiring

R.\ 255. ^

In March of 1988, the District Court granted defendants*
motions

for

summary

judgment

Exhibit C.

summary
and

judgment
motion

and
to

deniedl Sandy's
strike.

R.

259.

motion

Appendix

On April 8, 1988, the District Court entered

order of judgment and dismissal.

R. 265.

for

its

Appendix Exhibit D.

1.
The certified administrative record is contained in
envelopes 1 through 6 of the court record.
Each envelope
contains
a numbered
index of
the documents within
the
envelope.
The Chevron record is in envelopes 3 and 4.
The
McDonald's record is in envelopes 1 and 2, and the zoning of
the original parcel is in envelopes 5 and (J.
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On June 7, 1990, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the
District Court judgment.

Appendix Exhibit A.

Sandy's petition

for a rehearing was denied on August 6, 1990.

Appendix Exhibit

B.
II.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS.
1.

On April 5, 1987, defendant Yeates applied with Salt

Lake County to have the original parcel of 4.18 acres rezoned
9

from Residential R-l-8 to Residential RM-ZC^* and Commercial C-2 .
2.

The

hearing

the

Salt
matter,

Commissioners
approved.

of

County

Planning

recommended

Salt

After

Commissioners
1987.

Lake

Lake

hearing

approved

County

the

the

to

rezoning

the

that

matter,

Commission,
Board
the

the

of

after
County

application

Board

application

of

be

County

on August

5,

R. 102.
3.

Sandy City failed to appear at the rezoning hearing

before

the

County

action

challenging

Commission
the

and

rezoning

failed
decision

to

take
until

any

court

after

the

subsequent conditional use permit was approved.
4»

On August

16, 1987, Postero-Blecker,

Chevron, applied with Salt Lake County

as

agent

for

for a conditional

use

permit to build a Chevron station on 0.7 acres of the original
parcel.

R. 20.

2.
The
ZC designation
attached
certain
conditions
limiting the height of buildinqs and the nature of uses that
could be developed on the original property. R. 18.
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5.
September
concerning

The County Planning Commission heard the matter on
22,
the

1987,

at

which

application.

R.

objected to the development.
County

Planning

Commission

time

evidence

107-111.

Sandy

was

presented

appeared

and

The matter was continued by the

until

October: 13, 1987, at which

time the application was approved after additional evidence was
presented.
6.

R. 112-115.
Oral

evidence

presented

at

the

County

Planning

Commission hearings included the followingi
a.

Recommendations

residents in the area.
b.

in favor Of the application by

R. 110, 111.

Testimony

by

representatives

need for the service in the area.
c.

of

Recommendations for preliminary approval by the

d.
White

Testimony
City

in

Community

support
Council

Association of Community Councils.
e.

On

of

R. 108.

the

and

application
from

the

from

United

R. 110,

Testimony from Chevron officials estimating the

costs of the project as $175,000.00.
7.

of a

R. 113.

Planning staff subject to certain conditions.

the

Chevron

October

21,

1987,

R. 108.
th^

Board

of

County

Commissioners upheld the Planning Commission decision approving
the

conditional

City.

use

permit

by

denying

the

appeal

of

Sandy

The Chevron station, including the underlying

land,

Envelope 3, Document 4.
8.

is owned and operated separately from all other development on

-5-

the

northwest

permits

were

corner

of

obtained

10600

South

separately

and

from

1300

any

East,

other

and

all

development.

R. 180.
9.
upheld

On December 9, 1987, the Salt Lake County Commission

the

McDonald's

decision

of

the

restaurant on 1.3

original parcel of 4.18

Planning

Commission

approving

a

acres of land located within the

acres.

On June 13, 1988, Sandy filed

an action against Salt Lake County and McDonald's raising most
of the same issues it raises herein.

Sandy has appealed to the

Supreme Court an adverse ruling from the District Court in that
case.

The briefs have been filed by the parties and the case

is awaiting oral argument.3

ARGUMENT
POINT I
INTRODUCTION
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states
that certiorari will be granted only for special and important
reasons.
considered

The

rule

lists

the character

special or important.

of

reasons which

are

This case, as the remainder

of this brief will demonstrate, does not fit within any of the
reasons listed in Rule 46 or within any other similar reasons.
In

addition, many of the issues in this case are now moot since

3.
890211.

Sandy

City

v.

Salt

Lake County,

-6-

et

al. , Case No.

all defendants except Salt Lake County havte settled with Sandy
and have been dismissed from the suit.

POINT II
SANDY•S ARGUMENTS CONCERNING ANNEXATION
POLICY ARE MISLEADING AND UNRELATED TO
THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE.
A.

SANDY'S ERRATIC BOUNDARIES ARE NOT RELATED TO THE ISSUES
IN THIS CASE.
Sandy

argues

that

its erratic

bouhdaries, as shown on

the map in its petition, are a result of urban development in
the

unincorporated

area

of

the

county.

Nothing

could

be

further from the truth.

The configuration of Sandy boundaries

has

Sandy,

been

Sandy

determined

boundaries

and

by

islands

not
of

the

tounty.

unincorporated

The

erratic

area

within

Sandy4 are a result of gerrymandered annexations by Sandy which
have excluded

unincorporated

islands whetfe a majority

of the

property owners refused to annex or where Sandy has reached for
properties

with

high

sales

and

property

tax

base.

Sandy's

erratic boundaries have no relationship t|o the issues in this
case.
Service

districts

boundary problems.

are

also

blame[d

by

Sandy

for

its

No service district isi a party to this case

4.
Prior to the 1975 enactment! of former Section
10-3-2, there was no prohibition agai ist the creation of
unincorporated
islands
as a result o|f annexations.
The
prohibition against creation of unincorpo rated islands through
annexation is now found in Utah Code Ann. ;LO-2-417.
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and service districts
service

districts

are not on

are

beneficial

trial here.
or

Whether or not

detrimental

to

citizens

also has nothing to do with the issues in this case.
B.

THIS IS NOT AN ANNEXATION CASE.
Sandy treats this case as an annexation case by arguing

annexation policy

in its petition

by the Supreme Court.

as justification

for review

However, this is not an annexation case

and legislative policy does not support Sandy's position in any
event.
The argument that the legislature intended that urbanized
areas

should

be within cities

is true only

in unincorporated

areas where a high quality of urban services are needed.
10-2-401(3). 5

Code Ann.
Sandy

services

since

Obviously, Chevron

it

chose

not

to

did not

annex

at

Utah

need

the

time

any
of

development.
Utah

laws governing

be drawn along
10-2-414.
about

The

municipal

annexation

require

logical geographic boundaries.
annexation

act

also

requires

boundaries

and

urban

that

annexations

Utah Code Ann.
that

development

decisions

need

to

be

made with adequate consideration of the effect of the proposed
actions

on

adjacent

areas

and

the

interest

of

other

5.
Contrary to statements in Sandy's petition, counties
have been granted powers almost identical to cities' to provide
and separately fund urban-type services. Utah Code Ann. 17-5-1
through 17-5-88 (Powers and Authorities of Counties); Utah Code
Ann.
17-34-1
through
17-34-5
(Municipal
Services
to
Unincorporated Areas); Utah Code Ann. 10-8-1 through 10-8-89
(Powers and Authorities of Cities).
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governmental
annexed

entities.

this

commercial

Utah Code Ann. 10-2-401(6).

property,

it

development

would

within

residential area of White City.
The

point

is,

carve

out

the

If Sandy

almost

large

the

only

unincorporated

R. 339.

legislative

policy

with

regard

to

the

meaning of Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 does ndt in any way dictate
that

this

small

development

should

be

Therefore, Sandy's arguments concerning

within

Sandy

City.

legislative policy are

not justification for this Court to grant certiorari review of
the matter.

POINT III
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE
CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THIS CASE.
The complaint in this case alleged that the rezoning and
conditional use approval by the County of the Chevron property
were

contrary

plan.
the

to

the

County's

zoning

Ordinance

and

master

These allegations were in addition to and separate from
allegations

concerning

the

meaning

of

Utah

Code

Ann.

10-2-418.
The Utah Supreme Court has held in numerous cases 6 that
courts

will

not

interfere

with

zoning

decisions

as

long

as

6.
Marshall v. Salt Lake Citv, 105 U. Ill, 141 P.2d 704
(Ut. 1943); Dowse v. Salt Lake City__Cor^or_at_i_on, 123 U. 107,
255 P.2d 723 (Ut. 1953); Crestview-Hollac[lay Homeowners ASSIL..JL
Inc. v. Enqh Floral Company, 545 P.2d 1150 (Ut. 1976); Gayland
v. Salt Lake County, 11 U.2d 307, 358 P.2d 633 (Ut. 1961).
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there

is

Appeals

a reasonable
applied

basis

for

this standard

the decision.

The Court of

in its review of the merits of

the zoning decision and the findings of the Planning Commission
for

the

conditional

use

application.

Issues

concerning

the

interpretation of the master plan, the impact of development on
the area, and the need for development were properly considered
by the Planning

Commission

and the County Commission

and the

Court of Appeals correctly held that the record supported the
County's decision concerning such matters.
Sandy

attempts

to

argue

that

this

standard

should

not

have been applied because of the issues concerning the meaning
of Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418.

This argument has no merit since

the Court of Appeals did not apply this standard to its review
of

such

decide

issues.
issues

In

fact, the Court

concerning

the

of Appeals

meaning

of

declined

10-2-418,

to

having

affirmed the District Court on other grounds.

POINT IV
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT SANDY FAILED
TO OBJECT TO THE REZONING IN A TIMELY
MANNER•
A.

NOTICE OF THE REZONING HEARING MET ALL LEGAL REQUIREMENTS.
Sandy

zoning

attempts

hearing

for

to excuse

its

this property

by

failure
arguing

receive adequate notice of the hearing.
was published

in the newspaper

to

appear

that

at

the

it did not

Notice of the hearing

as required by Utah Code Ann.

-10-

17-27-14.

Envelope

5, Document

2.

In

Addition,

notice

was

posted at the County Government Center, the Whitmore Library,
and

on

a

Document 3.

telephone

pole

near

the

property.

Envelope

5,

County staff asked Sandy for a recommendation on

the rezoning application, to which Sandy rleplied.

Envelope 6,

Document 2, p. 4; R. 248 Comments of Mike Coulam.

Therefore,

Sandy had both actual and constructive notice that the County
was in the process of rezoning the property.
of Sandy
Chevron

admitted during
station

Commission
application.
notice.
B.

and
No

that
County

A representative

the conditional use hearing

Sandy

failed

Commission

claim was made

to

attend

hearings

that

on

it was

for the

the

Planning

the

rezoning

due

to

lack of

R. 109 Comments of Mike Coulam.

SANDY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE ISSUES
URBAN DEVELOPMENT DURING THE REZONING PROCESS.

CONCERNING

In its petition, Sandy claims that there was no "specific
use" for the property at the time of the rezoning process and
therefore issues concerning Utah Code AnnL
have been addressed.

10-2-418 could not

It is ironic that &andy now takes this

position because Sandy argued in its reply brief to the Court
of Appeals that the entire development was laid out during the
zoning

process. 7

Issues concerning

the a|pplicabili ty of Utah

Code Ann. 10-2-418 were well known to Sand^ at the time of tiie

7.
"The property owner's entire development was laid
out and presented to the County at the tim<b that the commercial
zoning was requested." Sandy Reply Brief, |p. 12.
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rezoning process and were raised by Sandy in its letter seeking
to

have

the

zoning

Commissioners.

R.

reconsidered

23.

This

by

record

the

Board

supports

of

the

County

Court

of

Appeals' determination that Sandy could have raised the urban
development issues during the zoning process.
Sandy
agreement

also
or

claims

that

understanding

the

with

County
Sandy

entered

that

legal

into

an

issues

concerning Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 would be addressed at the
conditional use hearing.
contention.
rehear

The

the

The record does not support Sandy's

Board

of

application

for

County

Commissioners

rezoning

since

the

refused
rezoning

to
had

already been approved and the ordinance enacted and published.
Envelope

5, Document

Commission

because

6.

the

It referred
conditional

Sandy to the Planning

use

application

for

the

Chevron station was pending before the Planning Commission at
that

time.

This

comment

can

hardly

be

construed

as

an

agreement between the parties as to where jurisdiction lay for
review of issues concerning Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418.

In any

event, jurisdiction of a court or administrative body over a
subject matter is not subject to a stipulation or agreement by
the parties.

State Department of Social Services v. Higgs, 6 5 6

P. 2d 998 (Ut. 1982); Bailev v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P. 2d 1043
(Ut.

19 84);

Public

Springville Community District v. Iowa Dept. of

Instruction,

109 N.W.2d

Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law §152.

-12-

213

(Io. 1961);

see

also 2

C.

SANDY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE THE REZONING DECISION
REVIEWED IN COURT.
Sandy argues certain zoning enabling| statutes

referenced

in the opinion of the Court of Appeals ape not applicable to
this case,

Whether those zoning statutes are all applicable to

this specific fact situation makes no difference in regard to
judicial

review

of

the

zoning

decision.

The

point

is

that

Sandy had the opportunity for judicial reyiew of the rezoning
decision

and

failed

to take that opportunity.

A

declaratory

judgment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-33^2 is an appropriate
action

to

review

interpretation
brought

under

of

decisions

statutory

provisions.

Rule

have been used
Actions

rezoning

to

brought

and

under

the validity

Rule

65B

of

of
the

to

seek

Injunctive

65A of the Utah Ruled
test

also

of Civil
zoning

an

actions
Procedure

amendments.

^Jtah Rules

of

Civil

Procedure for writs in the nature of certiorari to the district
court

may

decisions.
remedies

also

be

used

Sandy failed

to have

to

test

the

validity

of

zoning

to avail itself of any of the above

the rezoning

reviewed

i^i court

in a timely

manner.

8.
Navlor v. Salt Lake Citv Corp; , 17 U.2d 3 00, 4.1.0
P.2d 764 (Ut. 1966); Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake
City., 116 U. 536, 212 P.2d 177 (Ut. 1949).
9.

Marshall v. Salt Lake City, supr|a.
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POINT V
SANDY'S POSITION CONCERNING THE MEANING
OF UTAH CODE ANN. J 0-2-418 IS UNTENABLE
AND NEEDS NO FURTHER REVIEW.
The

statement

petition

that

the

is

made

estimated

exceeded $750,000.00. 10
basis

cost

of

Sandy's

to

greatly depending

the

by

Sandy

the Chevron

included

appraisal

impact

of

for

the estimated

fixtures, equipment and furnishings. 11
relationship

times

in

its

development

What Sandy doesn't make clear

for this statement.

the Chevron development

several

is the

the cost of

cost

of

land,

The cost of land has no

a development

and

would

vary

on when the current developer purchased

the

land.

If the land had been owned by the developer for a long

period

of time, the cost

likely would be much

less than the

cost of the same piece of land purchased recently.

Often the

developer leases the land and there is no actual purchase cost
or

the

existing
land

proposed

development

development

cost

is

not

included

may

involving
in

involve

an

additional

determining

cost

expansion
land.

of

an

Thus, if

projections,

the

result would be arbitrary depending on the date and the nature
of the land transaction and the nature of the development.

10.

Sandy Petition, p. 11.

11.
Sandy's appraisal estimates the Chevron development
to cost between $660,000.00 and $760,000.00, including land
costs of $210,000.00.
The appraisal includes the cost of
fixtures, equipment and furnishings. R. 133.
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Also,
intended

it

that

is not

reasonable

the County

to

believe

on

speculate

what

the

legislature

kind

of

internal

fixtures, equipment and furnishings will er^d up in an office or
commercial development at the time it has to decide whether or
not to issue permits.
possible.

In

application

many

In most cases, this would not even be

situations

where

for an office building

the

County

or commercial

reviews

an

development,

the owner does not have any or all of his specific tenants in
mind.

How offices or commercial developments will be furnished

and equipped is later decided by each tenarit after the building
has

been

Often

approved

such

change,

and

furnishing

constructed
and

and

equipment

the

later

offices

change

leased.

as

tenants

In most cases, it would be pure speculation

for the

County to attempt to estimate such costs.
Finally, these issues are not broad issues upon which the
future

integrity

majority

of

of

cities

commercial

and

depends,

as

industrial

Sandy

argues.

developments

cost

The
more

than $750,000.00 regardless of how the cost issues in this case
are resolved.

POINT VI
MANY OF THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE ARE NOW
MOOT.
Sandy,
judgment
Chevron

in

the

declaring
development

prayer

the

of

actions

illegal, for

-15-

its
of
an

complaint,

the

asks

for

a

County

approving

the

injunction

enjoining

the

issuance

of

building

permits,

for

an

injunction

requiring

removal of improvements or compliance with annexation laws and
for funds paid to the County because of this development. 12

On

October 3, 1990, all defendants except Salt Lake County and the
Salt Lake County Planning Commission were dismissed
suit based upon a stipulation
respect to those defendants.
that

Chevron

initiate

from this

that the issues were moot with
The settlement agreement requires

proceedings

to

have

the

property

in

question annexed to Sandy. ^
Since the Chevron gas station is already constructed and
Chevron has agreed to annex to Sandy, the only issues remaining
in the lawsuit are Sandy's claim for damages and the prayer for
declaratory judgment concerning the legal issues in the case.
The
Assuming,

claim

for

arguendo,

damages

that

the

is

totally

County

without

misconstrued

the

merit.
law

in

approving the Chevron development, Sandy suffers no compensable
damages

from

development,
property

the
it

owners

is

act.

If

totally

would

have

the

County

speculative
annexed

to

alternative development

in the County*

the

would

Chevron

property

have

12.
A copy of the prayer
attached as Appendix Exhibit E.

as
Sandy

denied

the

to

whether

the

or

proposed

an

Even if the owners of

annexed

from

had

the

Sandy's

property

in

Complaint

is

13.
Copies of the Stipulation and Order of Dismissal and
the Affidavit of Leonard J. Lewis, counsel for Chevron,
attached to Suggestion of Mootness filed by Salt Lake County
are included as Appendix Exhibit F.
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question

to

Sandy,

Sandy

cannot

approved this development
revenues

since

claim

that

it

would

have

and benefited from the fees and tax

it opposed

the development, claiming

that

the

proposed development was contrary to the Sandy Master Plan. 14
Actually,
annexing

the

Sandy will

Chevron

receive

property

an undeserved

now.

It

will

windfall

receive

by

future

taxes on a development it would not have approved and one where
the County provided all the expenses of bufLlding inspection and
other required development reviews.
The

declaratory

appropriate
City.

since

judgment

Chevron

has

action
now

also

agreed

to

is

no

annex

to

longer
Sandy

The Supreme Court has consistently held that declaratory

judgment
including

is
the

subject

to

defense

Associates, 646 P.2d

731

the

of

requirement

mootness.

of

Mferhish

justiciability
v.

Folsom

(Ut. 1982); Halj. v. Fitzgerald,

&
671

P.2d 224 (Ut. 1983); Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 U.2d 412,
375 P.2d

756

(Ut. 1962); Hovle v. Monsor^, 606 P.2d

240 (Ut.

1980) .
The only exception to the rule is for matters that are
likely to reoccur which have a wide public concern and would
otherwise escape judicial review.
Many of

the

legal

issues

Merhish y. Folsom, supra.
raised

by Sandy

in this case

have been argued and briefed solely by Chevron, and not by the

14.
Testimony of Mike Coulam, Director of Community
Development of Sandy and Michael Tingey, Chairman of the Sandy
City Planning Commission, Minutes of County Planning Commission
for September 22, 1987. R. 107-111.
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County.

These

Affidavits
under

Utah

of

issues

Chevron

include

and

the

Sandy's

to

issue of willingness

10-2-418, 15

Code Ann.

Motion

It

is unclear

Strike

to

annex

whether

the

County could even take a position on these issues at this stage
of the proceedings.
Finally, this is not a case of wide public concern or one
where the issues concerning Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 will escape
judicial review.

In fact, the issues concerning the meaning of

that statute are already before the Supreme Court in the case
of Sandy City v. McDonald's, No. 890211 16 , and therefore there
is no legitimate reason to continue this litigation,,

CONCLUSION
The issues in this case have been reviewed by the County
Planning Commission, the County Commission, the District Court,
and the Court of Appeals.
each

issue

now

raised

The Court of Appeals also reviewed

by

Sandy

in

its

review

the

Court

of

Sandy's

petition for rehearing.
There

is

no

conflict

between

of

Appeals'

decision in this case and any other Court of Appeals decision
or

any

further

decision
review

by
of

the

Supreme

Court

this

case.

The

15.
These issues are addressed
decision on pages 41-44.

which
issues

would
in

justify

this

case

in the Court of Appeals

16.
The District Court Order in Sandy City v. Salt__Lake
County/ et al., No. 890211 (McDonald's), is attached as
Appendix Exhibit G.
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Sandy

failed

to

raise

issues

concerning

the meaning

of

Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 in a timely mannef during the rezoning
hearing.

In

addition,

many

Sandy has cited no special

of

those

issues

and important

are

now

moot.

reasons which would

justify yet another review of the issues irt this case.
For

these

reasons

Salt

Lake

County

asks

that

Sandy's

petition for a writ of certiorari be deniec^L
DATED this

/jff

day of October, }990.
DAVID E. YCfCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

By

/J^t/^^
KENT S. LEWIS
Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Appellees Salt
Lake County and Salt Lake
County Planning Commission

R1070
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I

hereby

certify
in

that

I

foregoing

Brief

Opposition

Certiorari

to be mailed, postage

caused
to

four

Petition

prepaid,

this

copies
for
j

?

of

the

Writ

of

day of

October, 1990, to the following:
Walter R. Miller
Sandy City Attorney
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Sandy, Utah 84070
Attorney for Appellant
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1
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SANDY CITY, a municipal corporation.
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Utah; Salt Lake
County Planning Commission; K. Delyn
Yeates; R. Scott Priest; W. Scott Kjar; Steven
E. Smoot; Postero-Blecker, Inc.; and
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 880429-CA
FILED: June 7, 1990
Third District, Salt Lake CountyHonorable Raymond S. Uno
ATTORNEYS:
Waiter R. Miller, Sandy, for Appellant
Brinton R. Burbidge, Salt Lake City, for
Appellees
Yeates, Priest, Kjar, Smoot and PosteroBlecker,Inc. Leonard J. Lewis, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
Kent S. Lewis, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Salt Lake County
Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Jackson.
OPINION
GARFF, Judge:
Plaintiff Sandy City appeals the trial court's
dismissal of its action against defendants Salt
Lake County, property owners Yeates, Priest,
Kjar, and Smoot, and developers PosteroBlecker, Inc. (Postero-Blecker) and Chevron
USA, Inc. (Chevron). We affirm the trial
court's dismissal of Sandy City's action.
This action involves a 4.18~acre parcel of
commercial property located on the northwest
corner of 10600 South and 1300 East in unincorporated Salt Lake County. The property
abuts Sandy City's boundaries and is located
within an unincorporated "island" within
Sandy City's limits. Since 1976. the county
master plan and Sandy City plans have called
for rural residential uses of the property.
In 1979, Sandy City adopted a general
annexation policy declaration which, among
other things, delineated twenty-one unincorporated islands within the city boundaries
which Sandy City was willing to annex, including the present parcel. According to Sand>
City, this policy declaration requires property
owners to first attempt to annex to Sandy
City, thereby obviating the County's approval
for development of commercial property when

Lake Counts

com •

the development cost is in excess of S75O,0OO.
On August 5, 1987, at the property owne
request, the Salt Lake County Commtssic
without amending its master plan, adopted
zoning ordinance which permitted commcrc
development on the present property, San
City objected to the rezoning but failed
appeal the decision.1
On August 26, 1987, Postero-Blecker, t
agent for the property owners and Chevrc
applied to Salt Lake County foi a conditior
use permit to build a Chevron service static
car wash, and mini-convenience store on
acres of the property. This application ind
ated that the estimated value of the proj<
was 5250,000. The property owners also in
nded to build a McDonald's restaurant on t
property. On September 30, 1987, they fii
another conditional use permit applicati
which valued the McDonald's project
approximately S300,000. The property owne
did not petition to annex the property
Sandy City.
On September 18, 1987, Sandy City pro'
sted the Chevron application, indicating th
"Sandy City is currently considering annex
tion of the property and the annexation w
require an independent consideration
proper zoning for this property." It also ur
uccessfully petitioned the Salt Lake Coun
Commission to reconsider and amend its pi
viously passed zoning ordinance.
On October 13, 1987, rhe Salt Lake Coun
Planning Commission approved the Chevrc
conditional use application. On October 1
1987, Sandy City appealed this decision. T!
Salt Lake County Planning Commission, fc
lowing several public hearings, denied San(
City's appeal and entered findings of fact.
Sandy City then appealed the condition
use decision to the Salt Lake County Comr
ission, which held a hearing on December
1987. The Salt Lake County Commissic
affirmed the Salt Lake County Plannii
Commission's grant of the Chevron condii
orr] use permit, finding that the requin
statutory procedure had been followed ar
that the grant of the conditional use pernwas in the community's interest. Sandy Ci
then brought this action in the district court.
On January 18, 198S. Salt Lake Coun
filed with the district court the affidavit <
Helen Christiansen, the Salt Lake Plannir
Commission's administrative assistant, ar
the minutes of the Salt Lake County Plannir
Commission's September 22 and October 1.
1987 meetings, at which Chevron's condition
use permit application had been discussed ar
interested parties had presented evidenc
Subsequently, Sandy City submitted ar- aff
davit indicating that the projected cobt o\ tr
Chevron development was between S660,0(
to S760,000, and that the cost of the McD<
| nald's development would be betwee
I S900,0(»0 and SI, 100,000. Simultaneously. Sa
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L3ke County submitted the minutes of the
April 28, 1987 meeting of the Salt Lake
County Planning Commission, which involved
discussion of the zoning change, along with
Helen Christiansen's authenticating affidavit.
All panics moved for summary judgment.
Sandy City then moved to strike Salt Lake
County's affidavits, alleging that they failed
to conform to the requirements of rule 56(e)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Chevron
responded by filing an affidavit indicating that
the building value of the proposed Chevron
station was S175,0O0.
On February 4f 1988, the day before the
hearing on Salt Lake County's motion for
summary judgment, Sandy City's attorney
moved for additional discovery time pursuant
to rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
During the hearing on February 5, 1988,
Salt Lake County requested permission to
introduce into evidence the certified record of
the administrative hearings. These records
included the previously submitted commission
minutes, with additional maps and supporting
materials. Sandy City's counsel objected,
stating that he did not know what the admi;
nistrative record contained and, thus, the
record was prejudicial. The district court
overruled Sandy City's objection and allowed
the record to be entered into evidence. On
February 19, 1988, Salt Lake County, submitted the minutes of the December 9, 1987
meeting of the Salt Lake County Commission,
containing the appeal of the conditional use
permit grant, along with the administrative
assistant's supporting affidavit.
Salt Lake County filed the complete certified administrative record with the district
court on March 3, 1988. On March 15, i9S8,
the district court entered its decision, finding
that the Salt Lake County Planning Commission had properly issued the conditional use
permit, and that defendants' actions did not
violate the annexation statute, Utah Code
A n n . § 1 0 - 2 - 4 1 8 ( 1 9 8 6 ) . It granted
summary judgment in favor of defendants and
dismissed Sandy City's action. Subsequently,
Sandy City unsuccessfully moved for an injunction on the development of the property
during the pendency of the appeal. It then
brought this appeal.
On appeal, Sandy. City challenges the
summary judgment, first arguing that there
were substantial issues of material fact making
summary judgment improper because: (I) Salt
Lake County untimely submitted the adminstrative record in violation of rule 6(d) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) Salt Lake
County's administrative record and affidavits
were untimely filed in violation of rule 56 of
the Utah Rules o( Civil Procedure; (3) the
affidavits and other evidence presented by
Chevron violated rule 56(e) o( the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure by lacking an adequate

\ J _K0£_
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evidentiary tounda[ion. (4) (he ma! court
erred in refusing to grant Sandy City's rule
56(f) • motion for further discovery; and (5)
there were substantial issues of material fact in
the record. Sandy City's second major assignment of error is that the trial court erroneously interpreted Utah Code Ann. §§10-2418 and 10-1-4(11) j (1986) by ruling that (1)
to preclude urban development of the property
at issue, Sandy City had to formally declare its
intention to annex it prior to the occurrence of
the events leading tb this lawsuit, and (2) the
Chevron development, and possibly the
McDonald's development, did not constitute
"urban development* under section 10-14(11).
I. FACTUAL AND EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Before we address Sandy City's contentions,
however, it is necessary to examine the scope
of our review in ca^es dealing with summary
judgment and municipal zoning issues.2
In reviewing a j summary judgment, an
appellate court "con£ider[s] the evidence in the
light most favorablc| to' the losing party, and
affirm[s] only wheije it appears there is no
genuine dispute as p any material issues of
fact, or where, evenl according to the facts as
contended by the posing party, the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Bhggs v. Hofcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283
(UtahCt.App. 1987)!.
It is well established in Utah that "courts of
law cannot substitute their judgment in the
area of zoning regulations for that of the
[municipality's] governing body." Naylor v.
Salt Lake City Corp., 16 Utah 2d 192, 398
P.2d 27, 29 (1965) (fjootnote omitted). Instead,
the courts afford a comparatively wide latitude
of discretion to administrative bodies charged
with the responsibility of zoning, as well as
endowing their actiobs with a presumption of
correctness and validity, because of the complexity of factors involved in the matter of
zoning and the specialized knowledge of the
administrative body. Cotronwood Heights
Citizen Ass'n v. Boafd of Comm'rs, 593 P.2d
138, 140 (Utah 1979)| Thus, the courts will not
consider the wisdom] necessity, or advisability
or otherwise interfere with a zoning determination unless "it isi shown that there is no
reasonable basis to juitify the action taken." Id.
In a zoning actiop, Utah Code Ann. §109-15 (1986) indicates! that an aggrieved party
may "maintain a penary action for relief"
from any decision of the municipal body
within thirty days of the filing of the decision.
The Utah Supreme jCourt stated that "(t)he
statutory language plenary action tor relief
therefrom' presupposes the continued existence of the administrative action, thus suggesting an appeal rather than a trial de novo."
Xnmhos v. Hoard o\f Adjustment. 685 P.2d
1032, 1034 (Utah |l984). However. "[i)hc
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nature and extent o( the review depends on
Prior to the hearing before the district c<
what happened below as reflected hy a true on February 5. 198S, the County submi
record of the proceedings, viewed in the. light
the minutes of the Salt Lake County Plain
of accepted due process requirements." Denver Commission hearings held on April 28, ^
<£• Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. r. Central Weber
12, September 22, October 13, and Octc
Sewer Impiorcmcnt Dist., 4 Utah 2d 105, 287 27, 1987, along with authenticating affidav
P.2d 884, 887 (1955). The supreme court also These minutes contained testimony on all
found, in Xanthos. that where a hearing has the disputed issues. The record which
proceeded in accordance with due process County moved to be placed into evide
requirements, the reviewing court can look during the district court hearing contai
only to the record, which consists of the these minutes, accompanied by sonic doci
hearing minutes along with the formal findings entation and a large quantity of plat ma
and order. Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1034. but did not add materially to the relev
However, where no record is preserved, and information already before the court,
there is, consequently, nothing to review, the court admitted this record into evidence o
reviewing court may take evidence. Id. While the strenuous objections of Sandy City, stat
this evidence is not necessarily limited .to the that "everything down there is not essential
evidence presented below, the reviewing court a determination of these motions. And 1 th
may not retry the case on the merits or subs- that quite apart from this, [even] if the co
titute its judgment for that of the municipal disregarded this, it will have before it suf
body. Id.
ient undisputed facts of law to make decis?<
Because an administrative record has been in the matter." Subsequently, the court ad
preserved in the present circumstance, we find itted into evidence, as part of the record,
that this matter should be reviewed on the minutes of the Salt Lake County Commissi
record, and that a de novo trial is inappropr- hearing held on December 9, 1987, which Y
iate.
not previously been available, and varic
Under these standards of review, we now documents that were specifically requested
examine Sandy City's claims that the trial Sandy City's attorney.
court improperly granted summary judgment
Our review of the record, including i
on evidentiary issues.
administrative record submitted to the cou
A. Admission of Administrative Record
indicates that if there was any error in adr
First, Sandy City alleges that Salt Lake tting the administrative record, it was harml
County untimely submitted the administrative because it was essentially cumulative w
record in violation of rule 6(d) of the Utah respect to the evidence already before t
Rules of Civil Procedure* It argues that rule court. Further, some of the subsequen
6(d) requires supporting affidavits to be sub- admitted evidence was admitted at San
mitted at the time a party files a motion for City's request.
summary judgment, and that the administraHowever, we find that the trial court c
tive record is analogous to a supporting affi- not err in admitting the administrative reco
davit. Because the County submitted the at the time of trial. If we follow rule 6(d) 1
administrative record during the hearing on erally, styling the administrative record as t
the motion for summary judgment, rather equivalent of an affidavit in support of
than beforehand, and, consequently, failed to motion for summary judgment, the documer
give Sandy City notice of the contents of the must be served not later than one day befc
record, Sandy City concludes that the trial I the hearing unless the court permits them
court should not have considered the evidence be !• Tved at some other time. The court, th
contained in this record in arriving at its I refore, has discretion to admit such documer
summary judgment. On the other hand, the J at other times, including during the hearm
County argues that the Rules of Civil Proce- In this case, the court admitted documer
dure do not set forth any specific procedure during and after the hearing, in response
for certifying an administrative record from a requests made by both parties.
county commission to the district court, so
However, there are limitations to this dis
rule 6(d) is inapplicable here because it deals retion. Although the Utah Supreme Court h
only with the filing of affidavits.
found that the notice provisions of rule 6(
In relevant part, rule 6(d) states:
are not hard and fast, it has stated that a tri
court may dispense with technical complian
When a motion is supported by an
to them only if there is satisfactory proof th
affidavit, the affidavit shall be
a party had "actual notice and time to prepa
served with the motion; and, except
to meet the questions raised by the motion <
as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c),
an adversary." Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah I
opposing affidavits may be served
423, 519 P.2d 236, 238 (1974) (footno
not later than 1 day before the
omitted); see also Western States Thrift
hearing, unless the court permits
Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 5(
them to be served at some other
P.2d 1019, 1021 (1972); Bairas v. Johnson, 1
time.
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Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375, 378-79 (1962).
Although Sandy City objected to the admission of the administrative record on the
ground that it did not know what it contained
and, therefore, was unprepared to argue
against it, the trial court properly denied this
objection because the entire record was a
matter of public record, had been on Hie for a
substantial period of time prior to the hearing,
and both parties had access to it. Further,
significant portions of the record, in the form
of the commission minutes, were already
before the court and Sandy City had ample
opportunity to become familiar with them. "We
find no abuse of discretion in the court's
ruling.
B. Adequate Evidentiary Foundation
Sandy City's next claim of error is that the
affidavits and other evidence presented by
Chevron and the other defendants violate rule
56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
because they lacked an adequate evidentiary
foundation.
The relevant portion of rule 56(e) states that
"[supporting and opposing affidavits shall be
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence,
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated
therein." Inadmissible evidence cannot be
considered in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d
420, 421 (Utah 1989); Creekview Apartments
v. Srare Farm Ins. Co., 771 P.2d 693, 695
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); so an affidavit which
does not meet the requirements of rule 56(e) is
subject to a motion to strike. Howick v. Bank
of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 64, 498 P.2d 352, 35354 (1972); see also Blomquist, 504 P.2d at
1020-21 (an affidavit containing statements
made only "on information and belief is
iasufficient and will be disregarded).
Sandy City moved to strike defendants1
affidavits for their failure to conform to these
requirements. In its motion to strike, Sandy
City attacked defendant Chevron's memorandum in support of its motion for summary
judgment and the affidavit of Helen J. Christiansen, along with its attached exhibits, to
the extent that they were used to establish the
allegations set forth in Chevron's memorandum.
Helen J. Christiansen's affidavits served to
establish that she was the custodian of the
record before the Salt Lake County Planning
Commission and that, on the basis of her
personal knowledge, the hearing minutes and a
copy of McDonald's Corporation's application for a conditional use permit were the
correct records of the Salt Lake County Planning Commission. Under rules 902(4) and
1005 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, public
records are admissible as an exception to the
general rule excluding hearsay evidence if they
are "certified as correct by the custodian."
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Utah R. Evid. 902(4). Therefore, Ms. Christiansen's affidavit ponformed to rule 56(e) with
regard to the admission of the exhibits as
portions of the administrative record before
the Salt Lake Cqunty Planning Commission.
As such, they are admissible evidence and are
not subject to a motion to strike.
Sandy City challenges various statements
made in these minutes as being without evidentiary foundation. These allegations,
however, go to the merits of granting the
conditional use permit and not to any procedural defects. Therefore, we are not concerned
with them undef our standard of review.
Consequently, we'find Sandy City's objections
to the foundation of statements made in the
record to be withofit merit.
C. Further Discovery
Sandy City argues that the district court
erred in refusing to permit it to conduct
further discovery "pursuant to rule 56(f) of the
Utah Rules of tivil Procedure. Rule 56(0
provides that a court may continue a motion
for summary judgment to permit the moving
party to obtain affidavits or take depositions.
Hunt v. Hursu 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990).
Rule 56(0 reads ai follows:
Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that
he cannot for reasons stated present
by affidavit facts essential to justify
his opposition, the court may refuse
the application for judgment or
may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be ^aken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order
as is just.
It is generally held that rule 56(0 motions
should be granted liberally to provide adequate opportunity for discovery, Cox v.
Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 313 (Utah 1984), Ca7lioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838,
841 (Utah Ct. A^p. 1987); because information gained during discovery may create
genuine issues of fact sufficient to defeat a
motion for summary judgment. Downtown
Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 278
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). However, courts are
unwilling to "spkre the litigants from their
own lack of diligence," CaUioux, 745 P.2d at
841 (quoting He^err v. Wicklund, 1U F.2d
218, 222 (1st Cir. 1984)), so do not grant rule
56(0 motions when dilatory or lacking in
merit. Reeves v. Ceigy Pharmaceutical, Inc.,
764 P.2d 636, ^39 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Downtown Athletic Club, 740 P.2d at 27879.
A rule 56(0 movant must file an affidavit to
preserve his or her contention that summary
judgment should be delayed pending further
discovery. CaUioux. 745 P.2d at 841. In this
affidavit, the movant must explain how the
requested continuance will aid his or her

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

Sandv Cifv v. Si ll Lake Count>

A~

3i

.

_ _ _

I *6 1)1 ah A lx Ken. 3fct

opposition to summary judgment. Id. The trial
court has discretion to determine whether the
reasons stated in a rule 56(0 affidavit arc
adequate. Reeves, 764 P.2d at 639.
Sandy City filed an affidavit with the court
along with its rule 56(f) motion, stating that it
had been unable to take defendants* depositions or to obtain a certified copy of certain
county commission minutes. It indicated that
it wanted to pursue additional discovery which
would show that: (1) the proposed use of the
property contradicted the county master plan
and that insufficient evidence had been presented to the County Planning Commission to
demonstrate conformity with the plan; (2) the
proposed zoning would not contribute to the
general well-being of the neighborhood; (3)
the proposed use would be detrimental to the
health, safety, and general welfare of persons
residing in the vicinity; (4) the true scope,
costs, and impact of the development was not
accurately and fully communicated to the
county officials during the decision-making
process; and (5) the costs of the development
would substantially exceed $750,000.
To determine whether this affidavit was
sufficient to merit a rule 56(0 continuance,
several factors must have been considered:
(1) Were the reasons articulated in
the Rule 56(0 affidavit "adequate"
or is the party against whom
summary judgment is sought merely
on a "fishing expedition" for purely
speculative facts after substantial
discovery has been conducted
without producing any significant
evidence? (2) Was there sufficient
time since the inception of the
lawsuit for the party against whom
the summary judgment is sought to
use discovery procedures, and
thereby cross-examine the moving
party? (3) If discovery procedures
were timely initiated, was the nonmoving party afforded an appropriate response?
Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841; see also Reeves, 764
P.2d at 639; Downtown Athletic Club, 740
P.2d at 278.
In determining if Sandy City's request for
further discovery was meritorious, we first
consider the relevant standard of review. As
we noted above, in municipal zoning decisions, the courts do not consider the wisdom,
necessity, or advisability of particular actions.
See Sandy City v. City of South Jordan, 652
P.2d 1316, 1318-19 (Utah 1982). Instead, the
reviewing court may consider whether the
municipality acted in conformance with its I
enabling statutes and ordinances pursuant to I
its comprehensive plan. Naylor v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27, 2829 (1965). The court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the municipality on the

1
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merits of these issues, however. Id. at 129.
The trial record contained evidence as tc
Sail Lake County's enabling statutes, ordinances, and plans. It also indicated that the Sail
Lake County Commission considered evidence
with respect to all the issues on which Sandy
City wished to perform additional discovery,
The Salt Lake County Commission made
findings of fact going to the merits of these
issues.3 Discovery relating to the merits of the
issues was improper under the standard oi
review, but could properly be held with respect
to enabling statutes and procedural issues.
However, there was already substantial evidence on the record regarding the relevant
enabling statutes and plans. Further, Sand)
City did not allege in its affidavit that it
needed additional time to discover procedural
errors committed by Salt Lake County ir
granting the conditional building permit.
Therefore, we find that the trial court could
reasonably conclude that the reasons Sandy
City articulated in its affidavit would produce
only cumulative evidence and, so, were inadequate to merit a continuance under rule 56(f).
Further, Sandy City had sufficient time and
opportunity during the pendency of the action
before the county commissions to develop and
present evidence in its favor and to determine
and refute the defendants' evidence. The
record indicates that on August 5, 1987, the
Salt Lake County Commission adopted the
zoning ordinance allowing commercial development on the property at issue, following
hearings on the issue held in April and May of
1987. Sandy City objected to the rezoning at
this time but failed to appeal. On August 26,
1987, Postero-Blecker applied for the
Chevron conditional use permit. Sandy City
protested the application on September 18,
1987, and subsequently was involved in several
public hearings on the issue before both the
Salt Lake County Planning Commission and
the Salt Lake County Commission, at which it
had ample opportunity to present evidence.
S«.rtfy City appealed to the district court in
December 1987. The hearing on the summary
judgment motion was finV.ly held on February
5, 1988, nearly a year after the initial zoning
hearings had taken place. As stated previously,
the court will not use a rule 56(0 motion to
shield the movant from his or her lack of
diligence.
Finally, in a rule 56(f) motion,
(t]he mere averment of exclusive
knowledge or control of the facts
by the moving party is not adequate: the opposing party must show
to the best of his ability what facts
are within the movant's exclusive
knowledge or control; what steps
have been taken to obtain the
desired information pursuant to
discovery procedures under the
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wner's Ass'n. 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 46 (Ct.
App. 1990); Western Fiberglass, Inc. v.
Kirton, McConkie jfc Bushnell, 129 Utah Adv.
Rep. 28, 29 (Ct. App. 1990).
A. Annexation Procedure
Utah Code Ann. §10-2-418 prohibits
urban development "within one-half mile of
a municipality in the unincorporated territory
which the municipality has proposed for
municipal expansion in its policy declaration, if
a municipality is Willing to annex the territory proposed for such development under the
standards and requirements set forth in this
chapter." (Emphasjs added.) The parties disagree as to whether Sandy City, to prevent
urban development in the disputed territory,
was required unddr this statute to formally
declare its intention to annex the territory
prior to the events leading to this lawsuit.
Utah Code An^i. §10-2-414 (1986) requires a municipality, prior to annexing unincorporated territory of more than r^c acres, to
adopt a policy declaration indicating the standard "under which^ it is willing to annex the
territory. Sandy City argues that it expressly
declared its willingness to annex the property
before initiation of] the present lawsuit by (1)
promulgating a general policy declaration
indicating its willingness to annex the property, if petitioncdj along with twenty other
parcels; and (2) its counsel's direct statement
to the Salt Lake County Planning Commission
that it was willing ^o annex the property. The
trial court found that Sandy City was obliged
to make a formal declaration of intent to
annex, in addition to its general policy declaration, to invoke the protection of section 102-414.
Many of these issues are actually issues of
Even though Sindy City, in its master
law. The only issues of fact are the projected
cost of the project and whether the proposed policy declaration, had indicated its interest in
development was in compliance with the annexing the property should the property
county master plan and county ordinances. As owners so petition, the property owners never
we have noted above, these issues were disc- petitioned, nor did Sandy City attempt to
ussed and evidence was presented before the annex the property on its own. Further, it did
county commissions, which entered written not appeal the county's.initial zoning decision
findings and decided them on their merits. pursuant to Ut^h Code Ann. §10-9-9
Because their findings were supported by evi- (1986), and raise this Issue at that time.
dence, we do not disturb them on review. See Instead, it waited to raise the issue on the
USX Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 781 P.2d subsequent grant of the conditional use
8 8 3 , 8 8 5 - 8 6 (Utah Ct. A p p . 1989) permit, where the relevant issues do not
(administrative agency's factual findings will include the proposed use of the land or any
not be disturbed unless they are "arbitrary and annexation issue, put only whether the proposed use comports with the previously enacted
capricious").
zoning regulations and county master plan.
II. LEGAL ISSUES
Because Sandy Cijy could and should have
We next address Sandy City's contention raised this issue easier, we find that it is prethat the trial court erred in its interpretation cluded from raising it now. Sere Ringwood v.
and application of Utah Code Ann. §10-2- Foreign Auto U'ok'S, 786 P.2d 1350, 1357
418 (1986) and §10-1-4(11) (1986). Because (Utah Ct. App. 1990). As such, we do not
summary judgment is granted as a matter of address the issue of whether Sandy City was
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free required under section 10-2-418, in addition
to reappraise the trial court's legal conclus- to its master policy declaration, to officially
ions. Bonhum v. Morgan, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. declare its willingness to annex a territory of
8, 9 (19S9) (per curiam); Parents Against less than five acre^s.4 Consequently, we find
Drunk Drivers v. Craystone Pines Homeo- Sandy City's objection to be without merit.
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

Rules; and that he is desirous of
taking advantage of these discovery
procedures.
Callioux, 745 P.2d at 840-41 (quoting 2 J.
Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's
Federal Practice par. 56.24 (2nd ed. 1987)).
Sandy City's affidavit did not comply with
these requirements. Therefore, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sandy City's rule 56(0
motion.
D. Genuine Issues of Material Fact
Sandy City argues that the court failed to
consider evidence which created the following
genuine issues of material fact: (1) Sandy
City's willingness to annex, as shown by its
express declaration in its annexation policy
declaration and its attorney's statements
before the Salt Lake County Planning Commission; (2) that the projected cost of the
Chevron project exceeded $750,000, as shown
, by a certified appraisal setting the cost as
between S660.000 and 5760,000; (3) that the
I Chevron station was only pan of a larger
I scheme to develop the 4.18-acre parcel, in
that the Chevron station would take only 1/6
of the parcel, the property owners* represented that the property would be a "commercial
subdivision/ and that they would be the sole
developers of the entire tract; (4) that the cost
for the entire development, excluding the cost
of the land, would exceed $750,000; and (5)
the development was not in compliance with
the county master plan and county ordinances
which called for rural use of the subject property, and would create traffic hazards and
planning problems.
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We affirm the trial court's finding against
Sandy City on this issue, even though we
assign a totally different rationale than that
used by the trial court. Sec, e.g.. Ostler v.
Ostler, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 17 (Ct. App.
1990).
B. Urban Development
Utah Code Ann. §10-2-418 (1986) states
that "(ujrban development shall not be approved or permitted within one-half mile of a
municipality in the unincorporated area which
the municipality has proposed for municipal
expansion in its policy declaration.'" "Urban
development" is defined in Utah Code Ann.
§10-1-104(11) (1986) as "a housing subdivision involving more than 15 residential units
with an average of less than one acre per residential unit or a commercial or industrial
development for which cost projections exceed
$750,000 for any or all phases.m
Pursuant to its objective of preventing the
proposed development of the disputed territory, Sandy City argues that the trial court
erred in finding the value of the proposed
development did not exceed $750,000 because
(1) the definition of "urban development"
under section 10-1-104 includes not only the
value of the building itself, but also the cost
of the land and the value of the building fixtures; and (2) the $750,000 figure encompasses
all commercial ventures to be built on the
disputed territory. Salt Lake County, on the
other hand, alleges that the only relevant cost
under the definition is that of the building
alone and does not include the land and building fixtures, and that the $750,000 figure
applies to each individual development venture
separately initiated on the property.
Again, because Sandy City has not made
any attempt to annex the territory and should
have raised its objections to urban development at the time of the zoning determination
rather than at the subsequent granting of a
conditional use permit, we decline to interpret
this statute. Because the interpretation of
section 10-2-414 would have no relevance to
the propriety of the county's grant of a conditional use permit under our standard of
review, any interpretation we would make
would be an advisory opinion, which we
decline to issue under well established standards of judicial review. See Ringwood v.
Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350,
1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (where the result in
the prior action constitutes the full relief
available to the parties on the same claim, or
where the issue could and should have been
litigated in the prior action, the claim is precluded under the doctrine of res judicata);
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 129 Utah Adv. Rep.
32, 33 (Ct. App. 1990) (there is a longstanding
judicial policy in Utah to avoid advisory opinions). Therefore, we find this issue to be
without merit.

Provo. Vtt

Regnal W„ Garff, Judge
I CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1 CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
1. Under Utah Code Ann. §17-27-16 (1987). a
appeal from a zoning decision must be made withi
the time and according to the procedure specified b
the board of county commissioners. While thes
regulations are not a pan of this record, there is n
dispute that Sandy City failed to appeal the rezonin
pursuant to these regulations.
2. Sandy City relies upon annexation statutes an
characterizes some of the issues as annexation
related, however this appeal is from the grant of
conditional use permit, a zoning function.
3. The Salt Lake County Commission findings state
in part:
1. The estimated cost of the development is approximately $ 175,000
2. This development is consistent with
the intent of the Salt Lake County
Master Plan by placing commercial
development at major intersections
within the county. The Little Cottonwood District Plan was generally intended to be applicable through 1985 and
the map is now outdated in this immediate area. Since the adoption of the
plan in 1976, Sandy City rezoned the
northeast corner of 10600 South 1300
East to commercial, which changed the
character of the intersection. Additional
commercial development is now appropriate at this intersection and is consistent with the existing development approved by Sandy City.
3. The development will provide
additional gasoline services which are
needed and desirable in the neighborhood and community....
4c The development is buffered from
adjacent residential uses by property
zoned R-M and will not be detrimental
' to the health, safety or general welfare
of persons residing or working in the
vicinity or injurious to property or
improvements in the vicinity. The traffic
engineer has reviewed and approved the
application. Upon compliance with the
conditions required by the Planning
Commission, the development will be an
attractive addition to the community.
5. The proposed use will comply with
the regulation and conditions of the
Zoning Ordinance.
4. We note that the property at issue
consists of 4.18 acres while section 102-418 applies to parcels consisting of at
least five acres. Therefore, section 10-2418 would be inapplicable in the present
case.
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lORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING

Sandy City, a municipal
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 880429-CA
Salt Lake County, a political
subdivision of the State of
Utah; Salt Lake County Planning
Commission; K. Delyn Yeates;
R. Scott Priest; W. Scott Kjar;
Steven E. Smoot; Postero-Blecker,
Inc.; and Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,

Salt Lake County Third
District Court C87-07304

Defendants and Appellees.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, filed June 26, 1990,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.
Dated this l£_ '4
FOR THE COURT

/U&MU
Mary T.yNoonan,

Clerk

day of August, 1990.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of August, 1990, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
was deposited in the United States mail,
Walter R. Miller
Sandy City Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
440 East 8680 South
Sandy, UT 34070
Leonard J. Lewis
Attorney for Respondent, Chevron, IKS.A.
50 South Main St., Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Kent
Salt
2001
Salt

S. Lewis
Lake Co. Attorney's Office
So. State St., Suite #3600
Lake City, UT 84111

Brinton R. Burbidge
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell
Attorney for K. Delyn Yeates,
R. Scott Priest, W. Scott Kjar,
Steven E. Smoot, and Postero-Blecker, Inc.,
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
DATED this 6th day of August, 1990.

By ' " ^ v r V ~
I ~rf£/
Deputy Clerk
y-^

sail Laxe ^ounxy uian
Exhlblt c
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRl} JUDICIAL DIS^TGf,erK
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SANDY CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State of
Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
C I V I L N O . C-87-7304

Plaintiff,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of
Utah, et al.,
Defendants.

Plaintiff's and defendants1 Motions for Summary Judgment
came before this Court .on the 5th day jof February, 1988.
parties were represented by respective dounsel.
the Court took the matter under advisement.

All

After argument,

On the 25th day of

February, 1988, Salt Lake County's Motion for Certification of
Record

came before this Court.

The matter was taken under

advisement, subject to plaintiff supplementing the record.

After

reviewing the file, Memoranda, record and arguments, the Court
finds as follows.
1.

Salt Lake County Commission acjted properly in rezoning

the property in question, and was not in violation of any county
ordinance or county master plan, and did not act arbitrarily and
capriciously.

Furthermore, Sandy City appears to have waived its

right to object to rezoning.

2.

Salt

Lake

County

County Commission properly

Planning

is necessary

general welfare.
acted

properly

Commission

and

Salt

Lake

issued a conditional use permit for

development of the subject property.
facts,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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The project, based on the

and desirable, and not detrimental to the

Furthermore, the defendant Chevron Incorporated
in processing

its application

through the only

body with jurisdiction at the time, Salt Lake County.

Sandy City

did not have jurisdiction to accept the application.
3.

Defendants'

actions

do

not

violate

Utah

Code Ann,,

Section 10-2-418.
(a)

Defendants1 development does not constitute "urban

development" proposed within a restricted, unincorporated area.
(b)

Sandy City has not clearly stated it would annex

the subject property, but only that it will consider annexation.
It was not until the present lawsuit was filed that it indicated
that

it

would

annex

the

petitioned

for annexation

assurance

Sandy

City

subject

property.

Even

if

Chevron

and Sandy City annexed, there is no

would

approve

Chevron's

application.

Furthermore, Chevron is not required to petition Sandy City for
annexation.
(c)

The value of the fixtures and personal property

should not be considered.

The projected cost of the proposed

service station project is under $750,000.00.

Furthermore, the

application of Chevron should be considered a single development.

(d)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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Even if Chevron's application were not considered

a single development, and were combined with McDonald's project,
the project will still not exceed $750,opo.OO.
(e)
procedures

At this time

Chevron ha$ taken all the necessary

for approval of their application, and is ready to

proceed with their project,
4.
Salt

Based on the facts before the Court, it appears that

Lake

County

Commission

has

conducted

comported with all due process requirements.

a

hearing

that

It appears to have

acted within the scope of its authority, has conducted hearings,
and arrived at a decision, and does not appear to have acted in
excess of its authority, or in a manner so clearly outside reason
that

its

action

must

be

deemed

capricious

and

arbitrary.

Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, 555 P.2d
231 (1976).
5.

Accordingly, it is the opiniori of this Court that Sandy

City's Motion to Strike should be denied}/ and Sandy City's Motion
for Summary Judgment should be denied.

Furthermore, all of the

defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Salt Lake County's
Motion

for

Certification

should

be

granted.

Counsel

for

defendant Chevron is to prepare an Ordeif for the Court's

OOL^

SANDY CITY V. COUNTY

signature.

Said

Order

PAGE FOUR

should

be

approved

MEMORANDUM

as

to

fora

DECISION

by

all

parties.
Dated this

s ~> —

day of March, 1988.

RAYMOND S. UNO
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

H.|OiXC^|-!;?::;:,_£Y
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MEMORANDUM

DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I
the

hereby

certify that I mailed a true and correct copy

foregoing

following, this

Memorandum
\ >->

Decision,

postage

prepaid,

to

of
the

day of March, 15(88:

Walter R. Miller
Attorney for Plaintiff
440 East 8680 South
Sandy, Utah 84 070

STATE OF UTAH
) 38
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
, I. THE UNDCTSIGNfiO. CLERK OF THE OKTW
COURT OF SAJ.T LAKE COUNTY UTAH, CO HERE
CSaTlfY THAT THE ANNEXED AND FCREGOTKC
4 TRUE AHO FULL COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DO(
IkfENT ON PILE \HMY OFFICE A3 SUCH CLERK<WJTNfcSS MY H A > i ^ r 4 Q l a € A l i W l ' A I 0 C0C

Kent S. Lewis

TJHJS-U— DA; .

Deputy County Attorney
H QIXON HM^EY) a.|RK
Attorney for Salt Lake County D e f e n d a n t ^
2001 S. State, Suite S3600
Salt Lake City, Utah
84190-1200
Leonard J, Lewis
John W. Andrews
Attorneys for Defendant Chevron
50 S. Main, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145
Brinton R. Burbidge
Attorney for Defendants Yeates, Priest,
Kjar and Smoot
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-2599

00C2£3

Exhibit D

FILED IN CLEPKS OFFICE
Salt Lake Cou *y -••"1^

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Leonard J. Lewis, #1947
John W. Andrews,
#4724
Attorneys for Chevron USA, Inc.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SANDY CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State
of Utah,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF
DISMISSAL
Civil No. C87-7304

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION, K.
DELYN YEATES, R. SCOTT
PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR,
STEVEN E. SM00T, POSTEROBLECKER, INC., and CHEVRON
U.S.A. , INC. ,

Honorable Raymond Uno

Defendants.
The following matters came on for hearing before the
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, District Judge, on Friday, the 5th
day of February 1988, at 2:00 p.m.: (1) Defendant Chevron
U.S.A., Inc.'s Motion For Summary Judgment; (2) Defendants Salt
Lake County and Salt Lake County Planning Commission's Motion
For Summary Judgment; (3) Defendants Smoot, Kjar, Priest and
Yeates' Motion For Summary Judgment; (4) Plaintiff Sandy City's

Motion For Summary Judgment; and (5) Plaintijff Sandy City's
Motion To Strike.

Leonard J. Lewis and John W. Andrews

appeared on behalf of defendant Chevron U.S.k., Inc.; Kent S.
Lewis appeared on behalf of defendants Salt iLake County and
Salt Lake County Planning Commission; Brintoln R. Burbidge
appeared on behalf of defendants Smoot, Kjarj, Priest and
Yeates; and Walter R. Miller appeared on behalf of plaintiff
Sandy City.
The Court having reviewed the record and the memoranda
and arguments of the parties, and good caus^ appearing, it is
hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
(1)

P-laintiff Sandy City's Motion For Summary

Judgment and Motion To Strike are denied;
(2)

It appearing that no material issues of fact

exist, and that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law, defendants' Motions For Summary Judgment are hereby
granted.

It is hereby ordered that the Verified Complaint of

Sandy City in this action and all causes of action contained
therein be stricken, and this action be and hereby is dismissed
with prejudice.

..j

DATED this •£_

day of April, 1988 h

^^

BY THE COURT:

ATTEST
K DIXON H W-pV
C"«'V-. ' V , ^ ; \>\ i i ' j i L
» Vr^^(r X . Deputy
r — TC~)<*
TT

T
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^ ^ ^ ' ^ A / ^ ^ ' ^ ^ Raymond S. Uno
D i s t r i c t Judge
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

<Z/^/7f^L
VAN
& MCCARTHY
Leonard J. Lewis, Esq.
John W. Andrews, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendant
Chevron U.S.A.,Inc.
1600
50 South Main Street, Suite
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

Walter R. Miller, Esq.
Sandy City Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
440 East 8680 South
Sandy, Utah 84070

Kent S. Lewis, Esq.
Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Salt Lake County
Defendants
2001 South State Street
#53600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200

Brinton R. Burbidge, Esq.
KIRT0N, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendants
Smoot, Kjar, Priest and Yeates
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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37-

the

City

has

exhausted

all administrative remedies

and no oth^r plain, speedy or adequate remedy exists.
3®#

the City is entitled

to

the

remedies

hereafter set

forth in i^g Prayer for Relief.
SSSSSVATZCW OF CZftZXS

39°

^he City hereby expressly reserves the right to assert

other and £urther claims against
Commission
respect

ar i s ing

t^

policies

County

and

its Planning

out of or in connection with its conduct with

^he

^s

the

Property

or

when

such

ancj

their

annexation

claimte

may

and

arise

or

ascertainable whether at law or in equity, that may or
be subject

to the

taxation
become
may not

utah Governmental Immunity Act.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHERE^ 0RE>

the

city

the

prays

Court

grant

relief

as

follows:
*•
and its

^or judgment declaring that t^he actions
banning Commission

of the County

in making the proposed development

possible w^ re niegal and void;
2

-

^or a prohibitive

enjoining

the

issuance

injunction

and

obtaining

of a building permit or

or

other auth^ r i z a t i o n s o r approvals
development}

of

the

property

or

froiq the

extraordinary writ

County

bu|ildings

or

related to

improvements

thereon;
or
requiring
constructed

a mandatory

Defendants
on the

to

injunction
remove

p rope rty

or to
11

any

and

extraordinary writ

building or improvements

comply with

annexation laws

relating

to

urban

development

and

bring

the

Property into

compliance with Sandy City Development Codes.
4.

For

hereafter paid

an

accounting

of

all

funds

heretofore

and

to the County and arising from development, use,

or ownership of this property and improvements thereon;
5.

For an injunction and extraordinary writ requiring (1)

payment of

the funds

specified in

equivalent funds, to plaintiff;
of

all

reasonable

expenses

the foregoing paragraph, or

(2) reimbursement

incurred

as

actions by defendants; and (3) compliance

to plaintiff

a result of illegal

by defendants

in all

respects with provisions of the state annexation statute.
6.

For interest,

costs and

such other

relief as may be

appropriate at the time of judgment.
DATED this^£_ day of November, 1987.

WALTER R. MILLER
Attorney for Plaintiff

12
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DAVID E. YOCOM (3581)
Salt Lake County Attorney
By: Kent S. Lewis (1945)
Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Appellees
Salt Lake County and Salt Lake
County Planning Commission
2001 South State Street, #S3600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (801) 468-3420
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COl^RT

SANDY CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vsSALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING
COMMISSION, K. DELYN YEATES,
R. SCOTT PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR,
STEVEN E. SMOOT, POSTEROBLECKER, INC. and CHEVRON
U.S.A., INC.,

AFFIDAVIT OF
LEONARD J. LEWIS
Court of Appeals
No. 8$0429-CA

Defendants and Appellees.

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake
LEONARD

ss

J. LEWIS, being

states as follows:

first

dufLy sworn

upon oath,

1.

I am legal counsel for Postero-Blecker, Inc. and

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. in the captioned matter.
2.

All defendants except Salt Lake County have entered

into a settlement agreement with Sandy City which resulted in
dismissal of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari

as to all

defendants except Salt Lake County.
3.

As

part

of

the

settlement

agreement,

Chevron

U.S.A., Inc. agreed to annex to Sandy City 1.24 acres of land
located

at

approximately

10600

South

and

1300

East

which

includes the land upon which the Chevron service station is
located,
4.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. has filed with Sandy City a

petition to annex the above-described property to Sandy City.
A copy of said petition js/attached hereto
lis ((x
DATED thi

^%ay of October, 1 990.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this A %C

day of

October, 1990.

My Commission Expires

NOTARY PUBLIC
_
Residing at \£*M* Xl/1^ d^j

/P>

R1086

StftrftMi

j

-2-

*-J/~

The Honorable Lawrence P« S m i t h
Mayor of Sandy City
440 East 8680 South
Sandy, UT 84070

P E T I T I O N

The undersign ed, constituting a majority of the owners of
real property and the owners of not less than one-third in
value of the real property, as shown by i .he last
assessment ro lis, lying and contiguous t\ Sandy City
corporate lim its, desire to annex and hei 'eby petition
Sandy City Co rporation to accept annexati on and zoning of
approximately 4.44 acres of land in Sect].on 17, Township 3
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and [eridian, as shown
and described on the plat map and legal iescriptions on
Appendix f,Alf and f,BM to this petition.
The undersigned also petition Sandy City to accept
Neighborhood Commercial (CN) or Community Commercial (CC)
zoning of such properties. Petitioners Reserve the right
to withdraw their annexation petition if such zoning is
not approved.
Petitioner:

Date:

C h e v r o n U.S^A.
By.

C A7

Address of Property:

Inc.

^ L

10/1/90

1297 East 10600 South
S a l t LaHe County, Utah

Resolution Trust Corporation, as conservator for
Williamsburg Federal Savings and Loan
By_

1225 Easjt 10500 South
Salt Lake County, Utah

John Baker, Financial
Institution Specialist
McDonald's Corporation
By.

10550 Sojuth 1300 East
Salt LaJqe County, Utah

5"

Legal Description of Prcperty to 3e Annexe to Sand/ City;
Stqirninq

it

a pa;*t

N CC^36 ' 00 ' ? - 0 ^ 9 9 1 ir.d *l Q S o c g . ^ ^

50

't*t

f-«.r

:h*

East q u a r t * - c c - r » r £* S t c t i c n ! * \ T3S. P l S , SL &S»?1: anc r L n n n < ; t h s r r a
M ^ 3 S ' C 0 " £ 6 ^ 0 . 3 ' s e t alc^q t r ? * 3 - U l i r e of IJS'X1 Eds: S t r e s s : t n s i c c
N 3 ? ^ 5 £ ' 3 l u U 27'-*.^ f a c t : t^i*nc«
S Q°39'C0"U 3 3 - 0 7 f * « t te ths ME c 2 - « w of Whit© C i t y ^27 s u b d i v i s i o n : shancs
f a t t e n i n g t n * £ lin© a f s a i d s u b - i v i i i o n
S 0 I ° 4 3 ' 2 9 " W ^ 3 5 . ^ 5 fmmt: th9*ZB l i v i n g said su£ l i r a *r£ running a l c r g ihQ
>4 RCU l i * n * or" 10600 Sfiuth S : " © * :
S 8 9 0 5 6 r 3 1 " £ 3 5 6 . 3 1 f e a t to t * 9 oa:-.» £ f b a c i n r . i ^ g .
Includes a l l o'
28-17-230-014
29-i7~2£C-0lS
28-17-2SC-01*
28-17-2SC-017

parcels:
O.S^*
0.70
1.64
1.34

totAli

4.4<*

acrti
ac-»«
acr*s
acrs<
icrfi

C>«vron
Ch#vr*n
'Ji 11 iam«ourg S 4 * i n $ * Sank
McDonald*

COX^^CIAL DISTRICTS

15-0-4

PLLNTIED CEJrrSR/SSIGESORHOOD DISTEICT CS

(a)

Pnrpoae^
The CN district allows for the creation of
coaa&Arcial centers to serve the convenience shopping and
service oeads of neighborhood areas o£ Sandy City 0
The
Neighborhood Censac District designation is intended for
cotosiercial developments thj.fi vill relate co residential
neighborhood*
ace vill
ha compatible with
residential
character.

(h)

Prerequisites for District Designation.
Tor a parcel to
qua J1 fy for CN District designation, it shall comply with the
following:

(c)

(1)

A parcel shall he at least 3 contignous acres in else
acd no greater than 10 acre* in land axe*«
Parcels M T
he added to an existing CN District, if, however, such
addition increases a district to greater than 20 teres,
the enlarged district may qualify for CC deeignation.

(2)

A Of District shall he located on at least a cajor
collector street, preferably at one quadrant of an
intersection of such streets, and in a location that is
conveniently accessible from its service area.

(3)

An applicant for a CST District designation shall have
completed the pre-application conference for site plan
review. Section 15-22-2(b),

(4)

An applicant fcr CN designation nay be required by the
Director of Cocsnunity Development co submit an analysis
of the potential fiscal impact for the proposed
neighborhood center«
The analysis shall be prepared by
a
person
or organization
that
is professionally
qualified to perform fiscal analysis.

(5)

In the even* that no substantial construction of the
neighborhood center is tmdervay after one year from the
date of ieenanca of the son* change, the Director of
Ceomualey Development may recommend to the City Council
thee
the CT designation
revert
to
the previous
designation or that the district be merged with an
abutting district,

Uses Allowed,
A Commercial Center, neighborhood Chapter
13*2, la allowed a* a conditional use*
Upon completion of
site plan review and Issuance of a Conditional Use Permit,
the following shall be allowed ae pemitted ueeet
CI)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Athletic, Tennis, or Health Club
Automotive Self-service Station
Automotive Service Station
Business or Financial Services

9-1 i

COEMZRCLAL DISTRICTS

(5) Commercial Recall Sales and SerHces
(6) Commercial School
(7)tfedic-aiand Health Care Offices or Facilities
(8) Public Service
(9) Recreation Center
(10) Recreation, Indoor

(11) ReLLfcicus or Cultural Activity
(12) R*staurmt

(13) Alcoholic Beverage Class A
The follcwtng uses may be allov^d
separate Conditional Use Permit;

but

shall

require

a

(1) Arcade (Rafer to Sandy City Arcade Ordinance)
(2) Thaatre, C O M art Hall
(3) Industry, Ugkc
(4) Public Utility Station
(5) Restaurant with Drive-up Vindow
(6) Any use that la not integr*t«d| with the planned canter
or which occapiea a separate loc or its own street
frontage.
(7) Alcoholic Beverage Class B
(8) Alcoholic Beverage Class D
(9) Alcoholic Beverage Class E
(10) Alcoholic Beverage Entertainment
(11) Automotive Service Station
(12) Park and Ride Facilities
Location Restriction.
if tha building containing tha usa
or accessories thereto located within 250 feet of a
reaidantially toned district, the following use shall ha
conditional or not permitted as indicatad below.
C - indicates tha usa requires a Conditional Use Permit
H - indicates tha usa is not permitted
C - (1) Automotive Self-Service Station
C «• (2) Antoaotiva Sarvice Station
C - (3) Recreation Center
C * (4) lieoholie Bavarage Class A
H - (5) Axsnsamant Arcade
I - (6) Thaatre, Concart Hall
IT - (7) Restaurant with Drive-up Wlndbv within 100 feat of a
dwelling or tha probabla location of a dwelling on
existing rasidentially zoned property.
Dirvalopaant Standards*
A Neighborhood Coamarcial Centar
shall be developed in compliance witty raqirtrsaanta of Section
15-13-3, Planaad Cantar Standards.
guj1H-fng Height. Buildings shall be araetad to a height of
no greater than 35 faet for any part in t and ad for huaan
occupancy.

9-12

13

ORIGINAL

a BESS I

OCT 2 1990
Clerk, Supreme Court, UU

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
SANDY CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION,
K. DELYN YEATS, R. SCOTT
PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR,
STEVEN E. SMOOT, POSTEROBLECKER, INC. and CHEVRON
U.S.A. INC.,

STIPULATED MOTION TO
DISMISS SPECIFIED
PARTIES AND ORDER
Case No. 900425
Argument Priority
No. 16

Defendants and Appellees.
Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, Petitioner Sandy City and Respondents
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., K. Delyn Yeates, R. Scott Priest, W.
Scott Kjar, Steven E. Smoot, and Postero-Blecker, Inc.,
hereby stipulate that all the issues in the above-entitled
petition are mooted with respect to said Respondents, and
move that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari be dismissed
with prejudice with respect to these named Respondents,
each party to bear its or his own costs.
This stipulated motion is not intended to suggest
dismissal of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari with

respect to Respondents Salt Lake County or the Salt Lake
County Planning Commission.
DATED this 2nd day of October,, 1990.
/

<%t

Walter R. Miliar
Sandy City Attorney
Attorney for Petitioner

Leonard J.Lewi
-Attorney for Rej fp0nr5€nts Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. a Irltr PosteroBlecker, Inc

Brinton R. Burb idge
Attorney for Respondents K. Delyn
Yeates, R. Scptt Priest, W.
Scott Kjar, and Steven E. Smoot

ORDER
Based on the foregoing stipulated motion,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the ^bove-entitled
Petition for Writ of Certiorari is dismissed with
prejudice with respect to Respondents Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,
K. Delyn Yeates, R. Scott Priest, W. Sc^tt Kjar, Steven E.
Smoot, and Postero-Blecker, Inc., each ?uch party to bear
its or his own costs.

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari

-2-

is not dismissed with respect to Respondents Salt Lake
lanning££ma«:ssion.
County and the Salt Lake County Planning
Commission.
DATED this ,^s

day of
*>Ort^
m-r Gordon R« HallGhigy-Justice
Utah Supreme Court

-3-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 2nd
day of October"/ 1990, he caused to be mailed to:
Kent Lewis, Esq.
Attorney for the Defendants Salt Lake
County and Salt Lake County Planning
Commission
County Attorney's Office
2001 South State Street, #S 3600
Salt Lake City, Utah 184190-1200
a copy of the within and foregoing Stipulated Motion to
Dismiss as between Sandy City and Respondents Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., K- Delyn Yeates, R. Scott Priest, W. Scott
, Inc.
Kjar, Steven E« Smoot, and Postero-

Tnird Judicial District

\ 1989
•C-CJ'JM'Y

Daniel W. Anderson, A0080
Jodi Knobel Feuerhelm, A4570
Diane H. Banks, A4 966
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
P. 0. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Telephone: (801) 531-8900

u3»:-..«; 05~k

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SANDY CITY, A Municipal
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, A Political
Subdivision of the State of
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING
COMMISSION, MCDONALD'S
CORPORATION, and JOHN DOES 1-5,

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO
DISMISS AND'FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
AND MCDONALD'S CORPORATION
AND MCDONALD'S CORPORATION'S
MOTION TO STRIKE, AND
DENYING SANDY CITY'S CROSS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. C88-03898
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.
The hearing on McDonald's Corporation's Motion to
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment; McDonald's
Corporation's Amended Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for
Summary Judgment; Salt Lake County's Motion for Summary Judgment;
Sandy City's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment; and McDonald's
Corporation's Motion to Strike Affidavit and Appraisal of Gary
Free came before this Court on Monday, April 10, 1989 at 10:30
a.m.

Jodi Knobel Feuerhelm and Diane H. Banks appeared on behalf

of McDonald1s Corporation ("McDonald's"); Christopher Fuller and
Walter Miller appeared on behalf of Sandy City ("Sandy"); and
Kent Lewis appeared on behalf of Salt Lak£ County ("County").
The Court having reviewed the pleadings, affidavitsf documents
and exhibits filed by all parties on thes£ matters, having heard
the arguments of counsel, and otherwise b$ing fully advised,
hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:
1.

McDonald's Motion to Dismiss is granted on the

ground that Sandy's action is untimely as a matter of law under
the doctrine of laches.
2.

Alternatively, McDonald's ^nd the County's motions

for summary judgment are granted on all of the claims asserted in
Sandy's Verified Complaint filed herein.
3.

Sandy's claim under Section 10-2-418 of the Utah

Code ("Section 418") fails as a matter of pLaw based on the
undisputed facts in the record, in that:
a.
the cost or value of land is not included in
calculating cost projections und^r Section 418 of
the Utah Code;
b.
the cost of furnishings, equipment and
fixtures is not included in calculating cost
projections under Section 418 of the Utah Code;
c.
the projected and actual costs of the
McDonald's restaurant at issue a^e less than
$750,000.00; and
d.
Sandy City had not expressed a willingness to
annex the property that is the subject of this
-2-

lawsuit at the time that the McDonald's permit
application was approved.
4.

As an alternative ground for granting McDonald's

and the County's Motions for Summary Judgment, Sandy is
collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues relating to
its Section 418 claim, which were decided adversely to it in the
litigation involving Chevron in Civil No. C87r07304.
5.

McDonald's Motion to Strike the Affidavit and

Appraisal of Gary Free is granted as to the portions of Gary
Free's Affidavit and Appraisal relating to the cost of equipment
and improvements to the real property.

The Court finds that the

Affidavit and Appraisal fail to comply with Rule 56(e) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, in that the opinions contained therein are without
foundation and are based on inadmissible hearsay.

However, in

ruling on the merits of the pending motions, the Court has
considered and taken into account Mr. Free's Affidavit and
Appraisal.
6.

There are no disputes of fact with respect to

Sandy's Title 57 Claim, Agency Claim, and Ordinance Claim (as
those claims are identified in the Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of McDonald's Motion to Dismiss or in the
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Alternative for Summary Judgment) and the County and McDonald's
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on those claims.
7.

Sandy's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment against

the County and McDonald's is denied.
8.

Sandy's Verified Complaint is hereby dismissed

with prejudice.
DATED this

of April 1989.
BY THE COURT

ck'
istrict Court
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICfe
I hereby certify that on this

/j

day of April 1989,

I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
to be mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Walter R. Miller
Sandy City Attorney
440 East 8680

Sandy, Utah
Kent
Salt
2001
Salt

South

84070

Lewis
Lake County Attorney
South State Street, Suite S3600
Lake City, Utah 84900tl200
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Christopher C. Fuller
Durbano, Smith, Reeve & Fuller
4185 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 320
Ogden, Utah 84403

JKF.-041189C
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